Over the past two decades, by some measures, paying dividends has become a less favorable choice for firms. At the same time, the business environment in which firms operate has also become more competitive. This raises an interesting question: does a firm"s market power in its product market have an effect on its dividend policy, that is, is the competitive structure of the industry within which the firm operates important for financial policy? This paper investigates how and why market power affects a firm"s dividend policy. We use three measures of market power, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the degree of import competition and the Lerner Index and find that market power positively affects the dividend decision, both in terms of the probability of paying a dividend and the amount of the dividend. We also provide evidence that the route through which market structure affects the dividend decision is business risk: more competitive firms are riskier and less likely to pay dividends than firms with market power.
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Introduction
The dividend policy of Corporate America has gone through significant changes over the past two decades. Fama and French (2001) document that the proportion of listed firms paying cash dividends fell from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. Even after controlling for firm characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, and profitability, the propensity to pay a dividend still declined. Over the same period, the business environment faced by American firms has changed remarkably.
Alan Greenspan (2002) , at the time the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, pointed out that "a wave of innovation across a broad range of technologies, combined with considerable deregulation and a further lowering of barriers to trade, fostered a pronounced expansion of competition and creative destruction."
This transformation of the competitive environment has brought new opportunities as well as challenges for both incumbents and new entrants alike. In all likelihood it has increased the business risk faced by the typical American firm. These two trends elicit an interesting question: is a firm"s dividend policy influenced by its competitive environment, and in particular by its relative position in the market?
In this paper we conduct a comprehensive empirical study to investigate this linkage between market structure, risk and dividend policy. Since firms decide their financial policies to accommodate their business risk, in the sense that financial risk is layered on top of business risk, changes in a firm or industry"s competitive status should trigger changes in its financial policies.
Microeconomic theory has long shown that a firm"s market power affects its business risk, that is, the risk associated with operating earnings. Further survey studies (Lintner 1956 and Brav et al. 2005 ) have demonstrated that firms view the stability of future earnings as one of the most important determinants of their dividend policy. Consequently, a firm"s market power should influence its dividend policy through its impact on business risk. This risk-based perspective can help us understand the potential link between the above two trends, both in dividend policy and the degree of market competition.
At the same time, a number of regulatory reforms and market innovations have brought in new entrants to the capital market. Reforms in the financial industry have made it easier for some firms to finance through the public markets via an initial public offering, rather than relying on the private venture capital market; consistent with the new-listing phenomenon documented by Fama and French (2001, 2004) . These newly-listed firms, with predominantly unstable profitability but strong growth opportunities, are typically firms in the growth stage of their life-cycle and lack market power. Consequently, they are not proper candidates to pay dividends according to the life-cycle The industrial organization and international trade literatures recommend three market power measures which allows a relatively complete description of market power. At the industry level, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is used to capture domestic market power, by providing a more sophisticated measure of the degree of concentration within an industry than simple concentration ratios. In contrast the level of import penetration is used to capture the market power of firms exposed to challenges from foreign rivals, a feature of competition not captured by the HHI. The assumption is that the average firm in an industry with higher HHI or lower import penetration has higher market power compared to firms in other industries. Finally, firm-level market power is measured by the accounting-based approximation to the classic Lerner index, which directly captures a firm"s ability to charge a market price above its marginal cost and thus the elasticity of the demand curve faced by the firm.
The empirical findings from a sample of manufacturing firms during the period generally support the prediction that a firm with higher market power is more likely to pay a dividend and when it does pay more. The explanatory power of both the degree of import penetration and the Lerner index are statistically significant even when controlling for traditional firm characteristics associated with dividend policy such as the firm"s profitability, size, growth opportunities, retained earnings, and current risk. This in itself is a strong result, since these firm characteristics are themselves endogenous to the firm"s market structure. On the other hand, the explanatory power of the HHI is less stable; a result that could be attributed to the fact that the HHI is only available every five years and only for the short sample period 1982-1996. It may also be that the HHI is subject to the contestable market argument, associated with the fundamental changes occurring as a result of globalization and deregulation.
Investigation of the mediating channel for the impact of market power on dividend policy supports the risk-based explanation. Firms with higher market power experience less business risk in the future, which is reflected in both higher profitability and more stable operations. Hence, the persistence and stability of earnings in the future, consequent on a firm gaining market power, can reduce a firm"s reluctance to pay dividends or increase them, consistent with recent survey findings. This paper is closely related to a recent paper by Grullon and Michaely (2008) --it asks a similar question but from a different perspective. Grullon and Michaely (2008) focus on the corporate governance role of product market competition from an agency-based perspective. They conjecture that firms operating in highly competitive industrial sectors have higher payout ratios (either dividend or total payout), since competition constrains firms from wasting corporate resources through perquisite consumption and managerially based investment decision. In contrast, and with all else constant, firms with market power have an agency-based incentive to spend corporate resources for the benefit of managers, rather than shareholders. If this reasoning is correct, increasing competition over the past two decades should lead to better governance, more firms paying dividends, and larger dividend payments: a conjecture which contradicts the extant evidence
In contrast, the risk-based explanation advanced in this paper is consistent with existing evidence both over time and across firms. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Sample selection criteria and variable definitions are presented in Section 3. Section 4 reports the results of the impact of market power on dividend policy and the risk-based explanation. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
In an imperfectly competitive economy, a firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its own product, indicating that the market price of its product will increase when the firm reduces supply.
This firm is regarded as having market power since at the profit-maximizing output level it can profitably charge a product price above its marginal cost.
2 Further, given this ability to partially influence its price, the firm is able to smooth the fluctuation of its operating income in the face of exogenous economy-wide and/or firm-specific shocks. The reduced business risk due to market power will be reflected in capital markets, in the form of lower systematic and/or idiosyncratic volatility of the firm"s stock returns.
The impact of a firm"s market power on its risk has been investigated in several empirical and theoretical studies. 3 An early empirical study by Sullivan (1978) documented a negative correlation between the CAPM beta and market power. He speculated that a firm with market power will be able to "influence or more successfully react to major changes in social, economic and political events" and hence is less subject to systematic risk. This idea was formalized by both Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980) and Booth (1980 and 1981) who both looked at the impact of price uncertainty on a firm"s cost of capital. Due to the non-infinite price-elasticity of demand faced by a firm with market power, the economic rents generated from the optimal output decision 2 From an antitrust perspective, market power indicates the potential that consumers can be exploited and resources may be misallocated due to the absence of competition. However, if market power results from owning superior products or business acumen, it is justified by intellectual property and does not offend the antitrust laws (Federal Trade Commission, Protecting America"s Consumers, part III, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/classic3.shtm). Instead of investigating the social welfare implications of market power, this paper focuses on the impact of market power on a firm"s corporate financial decisions, more specifically, dividend policy. allow the firm to mitigate the impact of economy-wide shocks. Therefore, the firm"s systematic risk and cost of equity capital will decrease accordingly. evidence that a firm"s cash flow uncertainty, measured by its current stock return volatility, affects both its decision to pay a dividend and the amount of dividend payment.
It is clear from the existing literature that there is a strong link between risk, however defined, and a firm"s dividend policy. It remains to relate these results to the fundamental, which determines this risk, which we conjecture is in part the existence of market power.
Sample Selection and Variable Definitions
Taking the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database (Industrial Annual) as the base sample, we follow the method described in Fama and French (2001) , with some minor modifications, to get the raw accounting variables and screen the sample for outliers (see Appendix A for details). The CRSP historical SIC codes are used to identify the four-digit SIC code for each firm-year observation.
Due to the data availability of industry-level measures of market power from the Census of imports shipments exports imports   one NAICS code may be matched to several SIC codes, and vice versa. To avoid potential measurement errors associated with this translation, our paper only considers the time period when the SIC-based HHI is available.
6 This idea has been formalized by many models developed in international trade under imperfectly competitive product markets.
7 For an industry like Motor Vehicles and Passenger Car bodies (4-digit SIC code 3711), four-firm concentration ratio has always been above 90% and HHI was 2676 in year 1992 as documented by the Census of Manufacturers. Both indicators imply that this industry is highly concentrated. Further investigation on the Compustat shows that three major manufacturers have dominated this industry, i.e. General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford. However, it is improper to conclude that these firms can enjoy the market power since news on employee layoffs and branch shutdowns have been frequently reported in major journals and newspapers. Actually, increasing import has intensified competition and survival threat faced by these giant American car manufacturers. Import penetration in this industry has steadily increased from 14.68% in 1972 to 32.74% in 1996; while the average (median) import penetration across all manufacturing industries has increased from 6.63% (3.54%) to 20.97% (14.94%) during the same period. Therefore, without considering competitive pressure brought by foreign rivals, GM, Chrysler, and Ford may be incorrectly classified as firms with high market power.
where the denominator measures the domestic absorption of the products from industry i at year t.
Higher import penetration implies a lower proportion of domestic product consumed in the domestic country, which indicates lower market power for domestic firms.
Import penetration data for four-digit SIC-based manufacturing industries come from two datasets compiled by Professor Peter Schott. 8 The first dataset contains import penetration data during the Besides TSUSA, Schedule B, and HS classification according to reporting years, these data also contain import-and export-based SIC number. However, the import-and exportbased SIC number are different from domestic-based SIC codes, which are defined according to the method of processing for a good but this information is unknown for import and export (Feenstra et al. 2002) . Since the value of shipments required in import penetration formula is for industries classified according to domestic-based SIC, we need import and export data identified based on domestic SIC codes. Therefore, we use the data provided by Peter Schott. Our preference is to use the updated dataset as much as possible. Apparently, the first approach uses all the updated data, while the second approach only selectively uses the updated data after 1996. Thus, for the main test, we take the 1972-2002 value of import penetration constructed by the first approach. Nevertheless, we will also consider the values of import penetration constructed by the second approach in order to perform a robustness check on our results.
When the above two industry-level measures of market power are applied to a firm-level study, an implicit and unrealistic assumption is that every firm in a given industry has the same level of market power. To capture the cross-firm difference in market power, the Lerner index is used, defined as (P-MC)/P, where P is a firm"s product price and MC is the marginal cost of production (Lerner, 1934). Theoretically, a firm"s Lerner index is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of the demand curve for its product. By definition, the Lerner index directly captures the property of market power, i.e. the ability of a firm to charge price above marginal cost. One challenge to use the Lerner index in empirical studies is that marginal costs are unobservable. Researchers generally approximate the Lerner index by the price-cost margin, where marginal cost is substituted by a measure of average variable cost. Following Gaspar and Massa (2006), the Lerner index is defined as operating profits (before depreciation, interest, special items, and taxes) over sales. The Lerner index is estimated for each firm using data from COMPUSTAT.
[Insert Table 1 here] Table 1 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
Empirical Results
The main focus of this research is on the impact of market power on two aspects of a firm"s dividend policy: the decision to pay a dividend and the level of the dividend payment. To give a complete picture, all three measures of market power are considered both with and without controlling for other firm characteristics. The reason for this is that firm characteristics are themselves endogenous to the market structure in which the firm operates. After establishing the positive impact of market power on a firm"s dividend policy, our paper shows that this relation can be further explained by the effect of a firm"s market power on its future business risk. [Insert Table 3 here]
The results from the analysis are presented in Table 3 . In more detail, the models presented in Panel A of Table 3 To summarize, the results of the logit models presented in Table 3 exhibit a positive relation between market power and the decision to pay a dividend. Furthermore, among the three measures of market power, the explanatory powers of import penetration and the Lerner index are found to be significant and robust to the different specification of control variables, whereas the performance of the HHI is found to be sensitive to the inclusion of control variables.
The results tabulated in Table 4 present tests of the relationship between a firm"s market power and the level of its dividend payment. The dependent variable is the common dividend scaled by total assets. Time fixed-effects are used to control for common trends across all firms. Since import penetration and the HHI are industry-level measures, the industry fixed-effects are only applied for the regressions where market power is measured by the Lerner index. As suggested by Petersen (2009), clustered robust standard errors are used to account for within-firm correlation of the error terms, i.e. the observations are assumed to be independent across firms, but not within firms. Since common dividends cannot be negative, estimating the model by ordinary least squares (OLS) will lead to biased estimates of the coefficients. In order to circumvent this problem, the research design of Fenn and Liang (2001) is followed using a one-sided Tobit model for dividend payments (censored at zero). The marginal effects are reported in Table 4 . 10 [Insert Table 4 here]
The models in Panel A examine the explanatory power of the three measures of market power without controlling for other firm characteristics. The results are consistent with the prediction that firms with higher market power, as defined by any of the three measures, pay more dividends. 10 We apply the OLS regression for all the specifications and get qualitatively similar results.
11 The positive coefficient estimate of the market-to-book ratio seems contrary to the implication of the expected growth opportunities as found in Table 3 . However, this positive coefficient on market-to-book has also been documented in Fama and French (2002) and Li and Zhao (2008) . A firm"s market value measures two parts: the value of growth opportunities and the value of assets in place. The second part implies that market-to-book ratio also contains information about current profitability. Fama and French (2002) The results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 show that the impact of market power on a firm"s dividend policy is sensitive to the measure of market power used in the analysis. The explanatory power of the HHI is the least robust, which can be explained either by theoretical or empirical arguments. Theoretically, the classic "high HHI -high market power" argument is challenged by the contestable market theory proposed by Baumol (1982) . This theory argues that the threat of entry ensures that market power is constrained or eliminated; hence an industry with few firms may still be competitive due to the existence of potential entrants. In recent years, both globalization and deregulation have increased the threat of entry, which weakens the link between the HHI and market power. Nevertheless, the HHI still has strong explanatory power when control variables are not considered, making this reasoning less relevant. Empirically, the Census-based HHI used in our study lacks time variation since the data is available every five years during a short sample period.
Thus, the impact of market power measured by the HHI may have been absorbed into other dividend determinants such as profitability, size, and lower current risk, which in turn weakens the direct explanatory power of the HHI.
The empirical evidence suggests that market power has a positive impact on a firm"s dividend policy -a firm with higher market power is both more likely to pay a dividend and pay more.
However, what is left unanswered is how? Microeconomic theory shows that a firm with market power is able to smooth the fluctuation of its operating performance and sustain superior profitability when facing unexpected economy-wide and/or firm-specific future shocks, i.e. high market power helps reduce a firm"s business risk. With the expectation of more stable and stronger future cash flow, managers would be more confident about their ability to pay and maintain a dividend payment. This leads to the hypothesis that a firm with higher market power has lower business risk.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The models in Panels A and B of Table 5 test the validity of this hypothesis by investigating the impact of a firm"s market power at year t on the stability and level of its operating performance during the next five years [t+1, t+5]. Two measures of operating performance are chosen consistent with Barber and Lyon (1996) . The first measure is the return on assets (ROA), defined as the operating income before depreciation scaled by the average of the beginning-and ending-period book value of total assets. However, operating income is an accrual-based measure, which is subject to potential earnings manipulations. In order to avoid the bias introduced by potential earnings manipulations, Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest using the cash-flow return on assets (CFROA), defined as the operating cash flow scaled by the average of beginning-and endingperiod book value of total assets (see Appendix C for details).
Regression estimates tabulated in Panels A and B support the predictions that a firm with higher market power will have more stable and better operating performance in the future, regardless of which measure of operating performance is used. The predictive power of both import penetration and the Lerner index is robust to the inclusion of controls. It can also be noticed that coefficient estimates of the HHI suggest an opposite effect on risk, when other firm controls are used. To some extent, the relative performance of the three market power measures on predicting future business risks appears to be consistent with their relative performance in the dividend policy tests.
Coefficient estimates of the control variables show that more profitable, larger firms with more retained earnings have more stable and better performance in the future, whereas firms with high growth rates or currently riskier firms have higher business risk. The market-to-book variable is excluded from the regression specifications, since it contains the mixture of information on assets in place and future growth opportunities, which have opposite impacts on a firm"s business risk in the future.
It is of interest to examine whether the aforementioned results are stable over time or sensitive to different ways of constructing the variables.
[Insert Table 6 here] [1972, 1996] dataset. Appendix B clearly shows that many industries have been excluded from the 1972-1988 period due to this requirement. To ensure that our previous results are not driven by the sample selection bias caused by the requirement used to construct import penetration for the entire sample period, we relax this constrain in the subsample analysis. We divide the sample into two subsamples: [1972, 1988] and [1989, 2002] . In the 1972-1988 subsample, we will consider all the observations from industries with available values of import penetration in 1972-1996 dataset. The general results are consistent with the findings in Table 4 . Moreover, it is interesting to find that the explanatory power of import penetration is stronger in the second period, which is consistent with the argument that the increased levels of competition originating from globalization have become more important.
To check the robustness of our results with respect to the construction of import penetration for the entire sample period, the regressions presented in Table 3 and Table 4 were repeated by using import penetration constructed according to the second option, which requires comparison at 1996 to decide whether use the new dataset for the period 1997-2002. The results, not presented in the paper, are similar.
In Table 3 , the approach of Fama and French (2001) was followed using the dividend per share (Compustat DATA26) to identify the dividend payer. However, when investigating the level of dividend payments in Table 4 , Fama and French (2002) are followed using common dividend (Compustat DATA21), scaled by total assets. The analysis presented in Table 3 , was repeated by defining dividend payer dummy according to common dividends (Compustat DATA21). The results, not presented in the paper, are similar.
Finally, other combinations of control variables were used when testing for the impact of market power on a firm"s decision to pay dividends. In particular, all the specifications of firm characteristics given in Panel A of Table 3 are considered separately for each of the measures of market power. The results, not reported in the paper, are qualitatively consistent with those reported in Panel C, where import penetration offers the most robust explanation and the HHI is not robust to the inclusion of controls.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether a firm"s market power in its product market affects its dividend policy, and if so, how this is achieved. The study is based on a sample of manufacturing firms from 1972-2002 and considers three measures of market power suggested in the literature of Industrial
Organization and International Trade. The empirical findings generally support the hypothesis that a firm with higher market power is more likely to make a dividend payment and pay more when it does. Moreover, this positive impact can be explained by the fact that firms with higher market power will expect better and more stable operating performance in the near future, which implies lower business risk. The three measures of market power differ in their performance in the tests, where import penetration and the Lerner index offer the most robust explanation while the HHI is not robust to the inclusion of controls.
The findings of this paper are also consistent with recent empirical observations. The recent evidence on various changes in dividend policy can be related to the fundamental changes that have occurred in the competitive environment during the past two decades. Furthermore, the risk-based explanation suggested in this paper also proposes a potential link between two contemporaneous trends -the increasing conservatism in dividend policy and the increasing idiosyncratic volatility.
Table 1: Market Power Measures
These tables show descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of three market power measures for four-digit SICbased industries. Import penetration (IP) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are industry-level measures of market power. Import penetration (IP) is defined as the proportion of domestic demand that is satisfied by imports. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures the domestic market concentration. Firm-level measure of market power, the Lerner index, is aggregated at industry-level using equal-weight average (Lerner(EW)) and sales-based valueweight average (Lerner(VW)) in each industry each year. Lerner(Median) is defined as the median of the Lerner index across all firms in each industry each year. P-value is reported in the bracket. This table presents the results of investigating the impact of a firm"s market power, without and with controls, on a firm"s dividend payment level. The dependent variable is dividend payment, defined as common dividend (Compustat data 21) at year t scaled by total assets (Compustat data 6) at year t. Three measures of market power are tested -import penetration (IP), the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and the accounting approximate of the Lerner index (Lerner). Other explanatory variables include: firm size measured by the logarithm of total assets (lnAsset), Profitability, Growth rate of assets (AGR), market-to-book ratio (M/B), the ratio of retained earnings over total assets (RE/TA) and current stock return volatility (RETVOL). Details on variable construction are given in Appendix C. Coefficients are estimated by one-sided Tobit regression (censored at zero). Marginal Effects (ME) evaluated at the means of the independent variables are reported. Clustered robust standard errors are used to account for within-firm correlation of the error terms. Year fixedeffects are included for all the regressions. Industry fixed-effects, based on two-digit SIC, are excluded in regressions that use import penetration or/and the HHI to measure market power. 1996) , operating performance is measured by two variables: return on assets (ROA) and cash-flow return on assets (CFROA). ROA is defined as the operating income before depreciation (DATA13) scaled by the average of beginningand ending-period book value of total assets (DATA6). CFROA is defined as the operating cash flow scaled by the average of beginning-and ending-period book value of total assets. The operating cash flow is equal to the operating income before depreciation (item 13) plus the decrease in receivables (item 2), the decrease in inventory (item 3), the increase in accounts payable (item 70), the increase in other current liabilities (item 72), and the decrease in other current assets (item 68). In Panel A, stability of future operating performance is measured by the standard deviation of ROA (σ(ROA)) and the standard deviation of CFROA (σ(CFROA)) during year [t+1, t+5]. In Panel B, level of future operating performance is measured as the mean of ROA and mean of CFROA during year [t+1, t+5]. All explanatory variables are calculated at year t. Three measures of market power are import penetration (IP), the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and the accounting approximate of the Lerner index (Lerner). Other explanatory variables include: firm size measured by the logarithm of total assets (lnAsset), Profitability, Growth rate of assets (AGR), the ratio of retained earnings over total assets (RE/TA) and current stock return volatility (RETVOL). Coefficients are estimated by OLS regression. Clustered robust standard errors are used to account for within-firm correlation of the error terms. Year fixed-effects are included for all the regressions. Industry fixed-effects, based on two-digit SIC, are excluded in regressions that use import penetration or/and the HHI to measure market power. This table presents the results of investigating the impact of a firm"s market power and other characteristics on a firm"s dividend payment level for two subsamples, [1972, 1988] and [1989, 2002] . The dependent variable is dividend payment, defined as common dividend (Compustat data 21) at year t scaled by total assets (Compustat data 6) at year t.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Three measures of market power are tested -import penetration (IP), the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and the accounting approximate of the Lerner index (Lerner). For [1972, 1988] subsample, import penetration comes from the 1972-1996 import penetration dataset posted on Peter Schott"s website. For [1989, 2002] subsample, import penetration is calculated based on recently updated 1989-2005 multilateral imports and exports dataset provided by Peter Schott and the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Other explanatory variables include: firm size measured by the logarithm of total assets (lnAsset), Profitability, Growth rate of assets (AGR), market-to-book ratio (M/B), the ratio of retained earnings over total assets (RE/TA) and current stock return volatility (RETVOL). Details on variable construction are given in Appendix C. I estimate the coefficients by one-sided Tobit regression (censored at zero). Marginal Effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables are reported. Clustered robust standard errors are used to account for withinfirm correlation of the error terms. Year fixed-effects are included for all the regressions. Industry fixed-effects, based on two-digit SIC, are excluded in regressions that use import penetration or/and the HHI to measure market power 
